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ABSTRACT
This paper is organised in three parts.  The first is an assessment of the nature of the
environmental and regional weather patterns leading to predictable water shortages.
This is followed by the case study of the Pangara River community.  Analysed at the
micro-level, as the community tried to grapple with the gradual onset of lack of
water, it is hoped that the principles brought out can be anticipated at the regional
level.  The final part briefly draws on the earlier discussion putting forward sugges-
tions and recommendations for the establishment of a regional mechanism for
managing the water system.
infrastructure.  In order to cope with the urban population, states have embarked on
development strategies that are dependent on the availability of water without 
which these cannot be realised.  The context in which all the above is taking place is
an environment that has no regional water management institution.  Individual and
uncoordinated action by the region s countries is likely to erupt into war over water.
Failure to appreciate this and take anticipatory action, in the absence of a conflict
management mechanism,3 heralds a source of future conflict based on access to an
essential resource — water.
2. THE CONTEXT OF WATER AS A NEW SECURITY ISSUE
What has the end of the global standoff and abandonment of apartheid meant in the
context of water use in Southern Africa?
The availability of water underpins survival and development.  In Southern Africa,
at least four elements determine the success or failure of newly independent states
ability to provide water to their nationals.  These are the environmental and rainfall
patterns, population increase and pressure, development strategies, and the head
start already made by some states in exploiting existing potential.  Each of these will
be briefly discussed to reflect the extent of their contribution towards facilitating or
retarding access to water.
Environment and rainfall patterns
Southern Africa is a drought prone region in which predictable shortages of water
have to be overcome through contingency plans.  Sadly, this fact has not been
widely acknowledged.  Based on the first reliable records of 1888, later confirmed
in 1908, an eighteen year cycle of wet and dry years hang over the region (Chenje &
Johnson 1996:31).  Global warming experienced in the intervening period has
since been exacerbated by the effects of the dry cycles dating from 1860 to the
present.  Taking the last thirty years or so, the University of East Anglia Climatic
Research Unit has documented a significant 0,43…C increase in warmth occurring
between 1961 and 1990 (Guardian Mail 1998:11).  In their findings, the ten
warmest years since the unit s record began were from 1983 when temperatures
averaged 14,58…C (58,2…F) compared to 14,0…C (57,2…F) between 1961 and 1990
(Guardian Mail 1998:11).  The warm temperatures result in increased evaporation
affecting levels of harvested water in storage.  Kariba loses a quarter of its holdings
through evaporation every year and given the increase above, this loss level will also
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1. PREAMBLE
The collapse of the bipolar world during 1991 and the removal of apartheid in South
Africa by 1994 have overshadowed the recognition of new security issues until
these erupt into open warfare.  There is a wide gap between the levels of water avail-
able to citizens of different countries.  The disparity in accessing water that stems
from the different states ability in harvesting, conserving and distributing water, 
is a situation likely to become a future source of conflict in the region.  A single
example is illustrative.  Of the estimated regional annual average of 152 cubic
meters (cu. m.) of water needed by each of the 145 million inhabitants in Southern
Africa, South Africans and Mauritians use 410 cu. m. each while Malawians take up
a low 20 cu. m. per individual.  What this means is that there is a tiny population in
the latter country supplied with readily available water leaving the rest fending for
themselves.  Existing water based management systems depend very much on the
mode and period of rainfall delivery.  In Southern Africa the rainfall season is
restricted to the months of November to March except for parts of the Cape, South
Tanzania and Northern Mozambique.  During these few months water supply for the
following two thirds of the year is delivered.  While the timing of the rainfall has
become critical, wild gyrations in the rainfall pattern which register differences in
each year of as much as 30% have been noted, making cropping predictions unreli-
able (Chenje & Johnson 1996:27).  Consequently, management systems to harvest,
store and evenly distribute the water throughout the dry period covering two thirds
of the year are critical to the survival of states in the region.  Some states in Southern
Africa have partly achieved this position as a result of decades of technological and
resource investment in water conservation, purification and distribution systems.
Water availability is also affected by predictable changes in the environment, to
overcome which states have been forced to adopt counter-measures.
Secondly, there is the question of the historical fait accompli where states are some-
times faced with a river that has already been fully exploited.  As discussed below,
for instance, the Orange and Save Rivers have been fully exploited by South Africa
and Zimbabwe, respectively.  This has left no room for any subsequent initiatives 
to access water from these two rivers by emerging neighbouring states.  Third, the
region is experiencing marked population increase leading to rising urban drift.  In
most countries, the rural to urban drift averages 11% per annum coupled with 
a population growth rate of between 3% and 4%.  This has effectively outstripped
economic growth rates.  Worse, Tanzania and Mozambique are states occupying
pole positions amongst the world s poorest.  Thus any growth experienced during
the next decade will not be able to produce enough surplus to invest in water 
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availability throughout the rest of the eight dry months on average.  The result has
been increased reliance on ground and dammed water, harvested from fast flows
during the short rainy season.  Finally, certain dams have started drying up.  Lakes
Xau, Liambezi and Ngami in Botswana have (since 1982) become dry dust bowls
(Chenje & Johnson 1996:20).
Although limited ground water levels are available, these are prohibitively expen-
sive to harness according to the United Nations (UN) Ground Water Survey
undertaken in East, Central and Southern Africa in 1989 (Chenje & Johnson
1996:40-41).  This survey established that at most, trapped water in the rock cracks,
caves and channels is at depths of 800 m.  The alternative has been the aquifers
where water quantities being exploited are supplying nearly 80% of the region s
requirements.  Aquifer depths vary from 30 to 100 m., the deepest being in the
Kgalagadi desert at 600 m.  Extensive and uncoordinated regional exploitation of
aquifers has the added threat of unsettling rock formations with all the implications
for the populations on the surface.  
Population increase and pressure
Political independence in Southern Africa during the last two decades has led to 
the release of the hitherto captive population comprised of internally displaced
peoples inside countries at war and those who went into exile in neighbouring 
states or elsewhere.  Population concentration centres — such as Protected Villages,
Concentrated Compounds, Independent Homelands , Reserves, Refugee Camps,
Military Training Camps, Civilian Holding Camps — under control of the African
National Congress (ANC), Pan African Congress (PAC), Front for the Liberation 
of Mozambique (FRELIMO), Mozambique National Resistance Movement
(RENAMO), South West African People s Organisation (SWAPO), Zimbabwe
African Peoples Union (ZAPU), Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU),
Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), the Movement for the
People s Liberation of Angola (MPLA), Malawian exiles and other organisations,
have in the last two decades released millions of people into the mainstream
regional economy.  Host nations of mainly African liberation movements including
Lesotho, Swaziland, Botswana, Tanzania and Zambia have also finally found an
opportunity to direct their attention toward development away from the protracted
wars except in Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Lesotho.  On
attaining freedom, many proceeded to the towns and urban areas seeking jobs, secu-
rity and improved lifestyles, forcing local government administrations to provide
readily available water.  An 11% rural to urban drift per annum, coupled with a
57
increase.  In other words, the quantities contained in reservoirs and dams will have 
a greater portion evaporating than would have been previously forecast.  As if to
bear out the veracity of the scientific discovery, the intervening period has been
interspersed and characterised by droughts and shortages of water.4 The years
1935,5 1946-47, 1965-66, 1972-73, 1982-83, 1986-88, 1991-92 and 1994-95 have
witnessed particularly impoverishing shortages of water (Chenje & Johnson
1996:33).  The lack of water has been defined as follows:
Drought is a condition of abnormal dry weather resulting in a serious
hydrological imbalance, with consequences such as losses of standing crops
and shortage of water needed by people, livestock and wildlife.
(Chenje & Johnson 1996:31)
The droughts of 1991-92 and 1994-95 for instance dramatically reduced the
economic production and quality of life of most Swazi whose wealth is tied up in
cattle.  Over 55 000 head of cattle were lost and most households were pauperised
(Chenje & Johnson 1996:32).  For the countries that are landlocked, the existing
fishing industries, and tourist attractions such as those at the Victoria Falls, Kafue,
Kariba and Cahora Bassa, assume an added significance with the onset of drought.
Complete livelihoods including employment and survival are at stake.  Droughts
experienced on the continent, such as those of 1992 and 1995, forced Zimbabwe to
appeal for aid to feed 5,157 million people.  The effects of such droughts are not
only life-threatening but also economically dislocating, and an urgent response is
therefore always required.  This is what makes the shortage of water transcend its
seemingly mundane confines into the dimension of conflict about human survival
and economic security.
Even during periods of good rainfall — limited to the period between late November
and early March in each year, the distribution of water is uneven.  The rest of the
year is a dry period with only surface water readily available in wells until about
August in most regions.  Only the three regions of the Western Cape, Northern
Mozambique and the area east of Lake Malawi stretching into southern Tanzania
receive more than adequate water supplies mostly spread over two rainy seasons.
The rest expect 60% of their rainfall to arrive during the three wettest months of
December, January and February.  As one moves to the central areas of Botswana,
parts of South Africa, western Zambia and south and western Zimbabwe as well as
southern Malawi, this confined rainfall rises to as much as 80% of the total (Chenje
& Johnson 1996:34).  This therefore means that for most of southern Africa, states
must establish dams and other water holding mechanisms to ensure regular 
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giving birth to other spin-offs such as commercial fisheries, small-scale enterprises
and ginning mills.  Taking the researched Zimbabwean example, this showed that
the Tilcor Irrigation Estates on the Sabi-Limpopo provided agricultural employ-
ment and stimulated industrial and commercial development .  The Chisumbanje
Irrigation Scheme employed 4 000 agro-workers as well as an additional 1 000 in
milling and grinding sugar.  Their remuneration averaged Z$500 per year which
was way beyond the subsistence return .  The irrigation scheme raised the income
levels of farmers and created employment at the rate of a single job per 1,2 hectares
of irrigated land.  Similar experiences were noted at the Hippo Valley and 
Triangle Sugar Irrigation schemes (Zimbabwe Conference on Reconstruction and
Development 1981:68, par. 3,5).  The related benefits of mining centres and small
towns served to consolidate development ushered in by the irrigation schemes.  
Finally, attention was focused on the rural areas, previously untouched by imperial
and colonial development.  In 1980 Zimbabwe announced that 700 000 family units,
representing nearly 70% of its population, resided in the rural areas.  These were
spread amongst 174 (then) Tribal Trusts areas and would have had dams built
around them.  At least one dam for each of the 55 Districts in which the Tribal Trusts
areas were located was planned to be established within the next two decades
(Zimbabwe Conference on Reconstruction and Development 1981:68, par. 5).6
The three-pronged development strategy adopted by Zimbabwe in 1980 can be
extrapolated on a wider regional canvass.  These ambitious programmes — of
providing water to the previously disadvantaged urban arrivals in an environment
where the dreaded restrictive pass system has been abolished, of establishing irriga-
tion schemes and of constructing dams — reflect the type of aspirations of the new
political entrants.  Clearly, implementing policies oriented towards the majority of
the people and designed to raise standards of living is dependent on the availability
of water.  Activities taking place around the Victoria Falls, Kariba, Cahora Bassa
and Kafue are illustrative.  Tourism and internal recreation facilities, fisheries7 and
electrical power generation provide the engine for economic development and
growth in these outlying regions, as well as in the country and region as a whole.
The quantities of water required, as determined by new majority rule governments,
are staggering but unsustainable.  In Namibia, following the installation of the
SWAPO government in 1990, the trend revealed that consumption between 1970
and 1993 had hovered at 37 cu. m. per person per year.  In the final years, this rose
sharply to 95 cu. m., reflecting a 4,2% increase per annum, which is unsustainable 
in the long run (Chenje & Johnson 1996:6).  Namibia, one of the three Southern
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population growth rate of 3%, has effectively outstripped national economic growth
rates.  In the various camps, however, most endured severe deprivation.  It was since
they were living in barrack room type of accommodation generally supplied with a
single tap or portable water bowsers that consumption levels were held at artificially
low levels.  Of 142 million people in Southern Africa by 1995, over half were so
affected (Chenje & Johnson 1996:10).  The situation has not been helped by the
location of the acknowledged UN worlds poorest states , Mozambique and
Tanzania, in Southern Africa. 
However, an even more ominous prediction is the likelihood of the region s popula-
tion set to reach over 280 million in the next twenty-five years.  The available
resources, of which water is the most important, are static and are unlikely to cope
against such a phenomenal increase. 
Development Strategies
The second phenomenon lies in the development adopted by the new and emerging
states seeking to catch up with the rest and bring about a stable, economically inte-
grated and prosperous zone.  For the sake of the millions coming into the urban
areas, the new majority governments have set themselves the task of providing the
basic infrastructure to encourage development. 
Zimbabwe s example is typical.  A three-phased developmental strategy has been
identified: providing water firstly to urban areas, secondly to peri-urban areas
(including mining centres, small towns, townships and irrigation schemes), and
finally, to rural or communal areas.
Within the urban areas, 91 400 low cost housing units were planned to be built 
over three years (Chenje & Johnson 1996:110).  This was expected to house the
rapid influx into the cities and eliminate the mushrooming squatter camps.  Two
decades later this goal has remained elusive.  Meanwhile, urban unplanned settle-
ment has continued.  In a similar development, in 1994, the ruling ANC announced
that it would provide each household with between 20 to 30 litres of water within 
200 m. every day (Chenje & Johnson 1996:9).  The reality so far has been anything
but the achievement of these ideals.
The next developmental focus was on the agro-based strategy, which emphasises
reliance on irrigation schemes as the route to relieve impoverishment in the rural
areas.  The irrigation schemes, once infrastructure was established, were capable of
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and hydro electrical generation another 2,3% with 1,5% remaining as stock.
(Chenje & Johnson 1996:14) 
In Southern Africa, the estimated average quantity of water that should be avail-
able to an individual is 152 cu. m. per year.  Consumption levels reveal wide
disparities, however.  The affluent South Africans and Mauritians use 410 cu. m. per
individual, while Malawians survive on the lowest average of 20 cu. m. per indi-
vidual (Chenje & Johnson 1996:2).9 Because of its ability to have fully exploited
most of the local geographical potential amidst continuing increasing demand for
water, South Africa has now embarked upon external sources of supply.  For the
parched and heavily populated Gauteng Province, its water needs have been met by
importing the commodity from Lesotho.10 The LHWP is the single most important
resource base and national asset for Lesotho and has made the country self-suffi-
cient in electrical power while boosting the economy from royalties.11 This is
expected, over thirty years, to deliver water of good quality into the Vaal River
System that then supplies the commercial, residential and farming requirements of
the Gauteng Province.  Following the successful implementation of the LHWP, the
country has also expressed interest in accessing water from the Zambezi through
Botswana.  As an incentive the latter has been promised taps placed at intervals
along the pipeline as it carries water from the Zambezi to South Africa.  Zimbabwe
is also eyeing the Zambezi waters, to be directed towards Matebeleland and even the
Masvingo central Zimbabwean provinces.  This is an area of possible friction in
future that needs careful thought.
Zimbabwe and South Africa between them have monopolised the Limpopo River
system, denying Mozambique and even Swaziland further opportunities in the
future.  Zimbabwe has also exploited the Save River system to such an extent that it
leaves Mozambique with a water shortage (ACCORD 1998:15).  This has been
exacerbated by poor soil conservation practices that have silted up the river flow as
it enters neighbouring Mozambique.  This has limited the full potential that could
have been realised from this river by both countries.
Against this background, most states are harbouring aspirations to develop major
areas by providing water, but lack both the resources and technical capacity to put
these into effect.  Botswana, South Africa, Zimbabwe and to a certain extent
Namibia have within their borders bore-holing and dam constructing capacity.  For
the rest, outside companies have to be engaged at international tendering market
rates that are expensive.12 The result is to almost emasculate states ability to
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broad considerations addressed in this paper, a looming water shortage has been
predicted for Namibia, South Africa and Botswana to occur by the year 2030.
What is the state of access and sharing of water in Southern Africa?
Eleven states share national boundaries demarcated by the major river basins in
which some of the countries have already established extensive water storing dams
presenting a fait accompli to any newly independent state wishing to provide for its
previously disadvantaged peoples.  A historical overview of the Southern African
region reveals that some states have greater survival ability than others, resulting
from technical management of water established over the last three generations. 
The regional rivers include the Zaire, the Zambezi (on which 30 dams have been
constructed) (Chenje & Johnson 1996:38-39), the Limpopo (with 43 dams shared
between South Africa and Zimbabwe), the Okavango, the Orange River (with 29
dams, 24 of which are in South Africa), the Inkomati (on which 10 dams shared
between Swaziland, South Africa and Mozambique have been constructed), the
Ruvuma, the Cunene, and the Save (which has been fully exploited from 20 dams
all of which are in Zimbabwe effectively leaving little flow into neighbouring
Mozambique) (Chenje & Johnson 1996:xv).  The Lesotho Highlands Water Project
(LHWP) is saddled with six dams from which the country exports water to the South
African Gauteng Province.  This brief inventory reflects the state of access on major
rivers and how water has already been shared in Southern Africa.  
Southern Africa s objective conditions in the area of accessing water
As a result of appreciating the shortages in the availability of water, over the period,
some states have taken contingency measures.  Not only has South Africa estab-
lished the largest irrigation scheme in the region, the 52 000 ha. Vaalhartz Irrigation
Scheme, but between 1880 and 1980 she constructed 410 large dams (Chenje &
Johnson 1996:102).  As a result of decades of improved water management policies,
uninterrupted by wars, 
South Africa uses a high 51% of its available water for irrigation, 15,5% for
nature conservation, 12% for mining and domestic consumption, with
Industry and Forestry each consuming just over 7%, manufacturing 2,7%
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of this would be the parcelling out of tasks related to water to a regional planning
agency.  From its pedestal position, this body is equipped to better understand the
intricacies of regional cohesion and respond accordingly.  But such an institution
needs to be agreed upon.  This study therefore forms one of the small information
resource bases providing building blocks towards the realisation of the regional
response.
3. THE RESOLUTION OF WATER-BASED CONFLICT: 
THE PANGARA RIVER-NYANGA13 CASE STUDY, 1987-1996
The Pangara River starts from the hill past the road to Nyanga and runs through
eighteen plots ranging from 10 to over 15 acres.  Owners use the properties as resi-
dential homes.  This is within a commercial farming area, which runs downhill and
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Conclusions
The combined effect of predictable rainfall shortages, population increase, the need
to embark on development initiatives and the situation of co-existing with already
developed states attracting skilled immigrants from throughout the region is to
emphasise the need of intervention where water is concerned.  However, available
evidence shows that some states can take pre-emptive action while others lack the
technical and material resources to do it.
The dynamics of the distribution of water are to a greater extent influenced by tran-
sitory factors of economic development than by the engineering and technological
awareness of previous generations.  Put differently, some of the states enjoy what is
now an inherent advantage over newer polities.
Existing water system management mechanisms
According to Chenje & Johnson (1996:151), the earliest mechanism attempting to
co-ordinate Southern Africa s eleven states whose national boundaries share access
to water, dates back to 1948 when the Southern African Regional Commission for
the Conservation of Utilisation of the Soil (SARCCUS) was established.  However,
in the same year, the Afrikaner National Party swept the polls in the South African
elections.  Soon afterwards, the National Party introduced political programmes
inimical to the integration not only of their country alone but the region as well.
Since this early period, apartheid has contributed towards the economic, social and
military divisions still existing in the region in which access to water is the most
entrenched.  Following the South African April 1994 elections, which ushered in the
majority government of the African National Congress (ANC) within a transitional
arrangement, SADC Protocol 1995 on Shared Watercourse Systems has been
signed.  This is expected to assist with the Water Management System of the region
but judging from its inactivity, the institution has not been accorded enough political
and legal support or autonomy to make a difference.  While the concept put forward
in the case study of River Boards, duly constituted by local key stake holders who
are answerable to the Minister who then co-ordinates national development, is the
way to go, this procedure is not standard practice in most states in the region.
Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for example, are still to incul-
cate town and country planning methods when the military and political conflicts
presently tearing those countries apart are settled.  What is required then is to raise
awareness of water as a security issue to the level that state policy makers take cogni-
sance and begin to factor this into their general development plans.  A necessary part
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ends some 8 km. below in the Communal Area.  The youthful and fast flowing river
with a width of not more than 50 m. at the widest point, drops at a steep gradient
averaging 1:7 through several kilometres before reaching flat land.  The river 
flows strongly between December and April each year.14 As a consequence of the
topography, the water level in the river is uneven and except for pools around tight
bends the rest is a fairly shallow central river line.  Those living on the slopes along
the river are therefore forced to resort to capturing the fast flowing water during the
short period of flow by establishing weirs, dams, wells or bore-holes.  Since the
water table is erratic, those sinking bore-holes or wells find it difficult to strike water
the first or even the second time.
While all the residents accessed water from the Pangara River — and most needed
nothing more than the general Primary Rights allocations — a few with business
interests applied for and received Secondary Rights.  To access the water, especially
during the dry months, a number of residents had installed hydrams.  These water
driven pumps extracted only a small amount of 2 litres per second (l/s) while
allowing 45 l/s to pass as overflow.  The combined applications of those with
hydrams showed that a total of 93,86 l/s were drawn as Water Rights from the
Pangara and its tributaries.  There was however, a qualification to the Water Rights:
abstraction could only be effected after Primary Rights of human, livestock, fish and
other water dependent plant life had been satisfied.  A contradiction existed where,
for instance, Secondary Rights had been authorised for the establishment of a
piggery, but where the animals being reared had to assume Primary Rights almost
the moment they were placed into the pens.  If they were denied nourishment, their
condition would become life threatening, their destruction would result in financial
bankruptcy of plot holders and the general commercial derailment of ongoing 
operations would follow.
Over time, however, small-scale farming and commercial agriculture expanded.
Beef and pork production, fresh water fishing, fruit and vegetable farming and
protea growing (for exporting the flowers) became established.  This resulted in plot
holders, who were now small-scale entrepreneurs, beginning to employ workers.
While some of the workers came in for the day from the neighbouring farms or 
adjacent Communal Area, others lived permanently on the plots.  This resulted in a
dramatic human population increase with an immediate impact on water consump-
tion.  This was further exacerbated by water levels required for the upkeep of cattle
(for beef and milk), pigs, orchards, vegetable gardens and export flower gardens.
These certainly needed more than the rural 20-30 l/s per day or even the urban 
500 l/s standard daily requirements.
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Those who resided in the area, however, were in the majority and were severely
affected by the water crisis.  This forced them to resort to fetching and carrying
water from outlying regions for basic requirements.  This included driving to the
nearest gushing bore-hole if they were in good books with its owner, or to the
nearest towns of Nyanga or Rusape, at a round trip distance of some 80 kilometres.
In the process, many of them met and discussed their predicament.
Already factions began to coalesce around the more vocal characters in the
community on both sides.  A third faction also emerged, cutting across the Absentee
Landlords and the Full-Time Residents.  This was the more neutral, non-aligned
group, who were prepared to try and further understand the nature of the problem
and were wishing for an all-embracing solution.  These people, however, were
prone to be pressured to support certain factions at given times.  The most affected
people were naturally at the lower part of the Pangara River as the hyperactive
pumping engines upstream ensured that little or no flow continued.  Many of the
severely affected gravitated towards the Action Now vigilante committee.  Several
options aimed at addressing the water shortage were then considered.
Strategies for survival: local efforts to ease the problem of water shortage
Quite rightly, others began to question the validity of individual water rights and
whether or not some of the plot holders were accessing more water than their
licenses authorised.  On finding evidence of fiddling , many sought to challenge
these practices by taking each other to the Administrative Water Court.  Court 
decisions which upheld existing water rights or tried to qualify quantities to be
abstracted did not take into account the objective conditions of the onset of drought
and related settlement factors as discussed earlier.  Consequently, court verdicts
failed to provide a lasting solution.  This route appeared to have been exercised by
the more affluent members of the community.  However, this only served to poison
already strained personal relations. 
Later, each of the factions contacted the office of the Ministry of Water and
Development, and requested officials to come out and enforce approved water rights
where these were being openly flouted.  In a classical case of African conditions,
officials indicated their willingness to come out, but their inability due to lack of
transport.  At different times each of the factions then provided transport or bus fares
to the officials.  When they arrived, however, the officials would be monopolised by
the faction who had brought them out.  The other faction, having been downplayed
in such a way, would simply wait several weeks before they also brought out an 
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The first signs of reduced water flow (in retrospect) occurred during the erratic rains
and drought of 1987.  Quietly, each of the water abstractors found means to address
what was then perceived as a minor shortage.  Some constructed weirs while others
established small dams to boost available quantities.  In order to siphon more than
the hydram rate of 2 l/s and to ensure business survival, others invested in diesel and
electric pumps.  These could abstract quantities required within hours if not minutes
during the rainy season.  In order to cater for the dry months after April, many sunk
bore-holes or wells.  Sinking a bore-hole is at the best of times a risky undertaking,
based on probabilities and predictions about the likely flow of water.  Bore-hole
construction companies have, as standard practice, fail-safe conditions according to
which, in the event that they do not strike water, the risk is borne by the customer.
Sinking a bore-hole on the steep Pangara slopes, became, more than anywhere else,
a hit or miss affair.  With most residents unable to afford the costs, the majority was
forced to borrow from the banks.  In such an event, a failure could result in long-
term indebtedness with little prospect of having alleviated the situation of the water
shortage.  The responsibility of providing expensive infrastructure as an individual
had become a very heavy burden.  In the end, only the wealthy could indulge.  The
net effect was to polarise the community into haves and have-nots .
In sinking bore-holes, residents had to apply for increased water rights and not a
single applicant from Pangara had such an application turned down.  The almost
wholesale granting of water rights was in excess of what the river could sufficiently
provide.  In retrospect, evidence showed that the Ministry of Water and Develop-
ment through its Mutare office did not thoroughly investigate the submissions and
by allowing increased abstraction, worsened the already desperate situation.  Those
with additional water rights and located upstream where they could now legally
install and run powerful diesel or electric pumping engines affected the residual
flow of water supposed to be allowed to supply those below. 
All the above mentioned efforts could only have a limited effect as long as the
drought conditions prevailed.  The 1990, 1992 and 1995 droughts gripped the
country and the region.  The impact on the Pangara River community varied.  While
some of the people lived on the plots, others used these as weekend and holiday
resorts, commuting from Harare, the capital.  This latter group could easily leave
the problem on a Monday or even not come out when they telephoned their prop-
erty managers and were informed about the continued lack of water.  They would
concern themselves with worrying about the sustenance of their staff and animals .
In other words, they could afford to take a detached view of the crisis.  As the crisis
evolved, these people were soon referred to as absentee landlords .
66 Southern Africa in water crisisMartin Revai Rupiya
Those who resided in the area, however, were in the majority and were severely
affected by the water crisis.  This forced them to resort to fetching and carrying
water from outlying regions for basic requirements.  This included driving to the
nearest gushing bore-hole if they were in good books with its owner, or to the
nearest towns of Nyanga or Rusape, at a round trip distance of some 80 kilometres.
In the process, many of them met and discussed their predicament.
Already factions began to coalesce around the more vocal characters in the
community on both sides.  A third faction also emerged, cutting across the Absentee
Landlords and the Full-Time Residents.  This was the more neutral, non-aligned
group, who were prepared to try and further understand the nature of the problem
and were wishing for an all-embracing solution.  These people, however, were
prone to be pressured to support certain factions at given times.  The most affected
people were naturally at the lower part of the Pangara River as the hyperactive
pumping engines upstream ensured that little or no flow continued.  Many of the
severely affected gravitated towards the Action Now vigilante committee.  Several
options aimed at addressing the water shortage were then considered.
Strategies for survival: local efforts to ease the problem of water shortage
Quite rightly, others began to question the validity of individual water rights and
whether or not some of the plot holders were accessing more water than their
licenses authorised.  On finding evidence of fiddling , many sought to challenge
these practices by taking each other to the Administrative Water Court.  Court 
decisions which upheld existing water rights or tried to qualify quantities to be
abstracted did not take into account the objective conditions of the onset of drought
and related settlement factors as discussed earlier.  Consequently, court verdicts
failed to provide a lasting solution.  This route appeared to have been exercised by
the more affluent members of the community.  However, this only served to poison
already strained personal relations. 
Later, each of the factions contacted the office of the Ministry of Water and
Development, and requested officials to come out and enforce approved water rights
where these were being openly flouted.  In a classical case of African conditions,
officials indicated their willingness to come out, but their inability due to lack of
transport.  At different times each of the factions then provided transport or bus fares
to the officials.  When they arrived, however, the officials would be monopolised by
the faction who had brought them out.  The other faction, having been downplayed
in such a way, would simply wait several weeks before they also brought out an 
67
The first signs of reduced water flow (in retrospect) occurred during the erratic rains
and drought of 1987.  Quietly, each of the water abstractors found means to address
what was then perceived as a minor shortage.  Some constructed weirs while others
established small dams to boost available quantities.  In order to siphon more than
the hydram rate of 2 l/s and to ensure business survival, others invested in diesel and
electric pumps.  These could abstract quantities required within hours if not minutes
during the rainy season.  In order to cater for the dry months after April, many sunk
bore-holes or wells.  Sinking a bore-hole is at the best of times a risky undertaking,
based on probabilities and predictions about the likely flow of water.  Bore-hole
construction companies have, as standard practice, fail-safe conditions according to
which, in the event that they do not strike water, the risk is borne by the customer.
Sinking a bore-hole on the steep Pangara slopes, became, more than anywhere else,
a hit or miss affair.  With most residents unable to afford the costs, the majority was
forced to borrow from the banks.  In such an event, a failure could result in long-
term indebtedness with little prospect of having alleviated the situation of the water
shortage.  The responsibility of providing expensive infrastructure as an individual
had become a very heavy burden.  In the end, only the wealthy could indulge.  The
net effect was to polarise the community into haves and have-nots .
In sinking bore-holes, residents had to apply for increased water rights and not a
single applicant from Pangara had such an application turned down.  The almost
wholesale granting of water rights was in excess of what the river could sufficiently
provide.  In retrospect, evidence showed that the Ministry of Water and Develop-
ment through its Mutare office did not thoroughly investigate the submissions and
by allowing increased abstraction, worsened the already desperate situation.  Those
with additional water rights and located upstream where they could now legally
install and run powerful diesel or electric pumping engines affected the residual
flow of water supposed to be allowed to supply those below. 
All the above mentioned efforts could only have a limited effect as long as the
drought conditions prevailed.  The 1990, 1992 and 1995 droughts gripped the
country and the region.  The impact on the Pangara River community varied.  While
some of the people lived on the plots, others used these as weekend and holiday
resorts, commuting from Harare, the capital.  This latter group could easily leave
the problem on a Monday or even not come out when they telephoned their prop-
erty managers and were informed about the continued lack of water.  They would
concern themselves with worrying about the sustenance of their staff and animals .
In other words, they could afford to take a detached view of the crisis.  As the crisis
evolved, these people were soon referred to as absentee landlords .
66 Southern Africa in water crisisMartin Revai Rupiya
Studies (CDS) at the University of Zimbabwe, following a chance meeting with one
of the neutrals , was invited to try and provide a solution to the unending crisis. 
The methodology was firstly to undertake library research in order to understand
problems related to accessing water and the legal requirements surrounding this
issue.  This revealed that everyone could exercise Primary Rights for basic require-
ments and apply for Secondary Rights for small scale or entrepreneurial purposes
(Water Act of Zimbabwe 1996:594-595).  This also defined the amount of water
authorised to be abstracted without prejudicing those downstream.  A list from the
Ministry showed that most of the people concerned had complied with the require-
ments, but that the granting of water rights had exceeded the capacity of the small
river.  It also became clear that officials were aware of some of the illegal contrap-
tions built to increase individual plot holder water holdings, but that they had come
across this reaction elsewhere across the country and chose to ignore this because of
the harsh drought conditions, unless they were forced to intervene.  The result was
therefore a reluctant official response to what was perceived as life threatening by
those making the reports.
This was then followed by fieldwork.  On the one hand, interviews of persons
concerned with the Pangara River conflict were undertaken.  The opportunity was
used to generate confidence and trust.  Several visits to the site were made, initially
to physically inspect the river against the claims and counter-claims and later to
tentatively suggest the way forward.  Based on preliminary conclusions drawn from
the library research as well as from early indicators gleaned from the ongoing 
interviews, a possible resolution agenda began to take shape.  During the initial
visits, the researchers took the opportunity to portray neutral credentials and build
confidence with the community.  This was achieved by adopting a very visible pres-
ence and by assuring the people that their plight was being listened to.  It was also at
this early stage that expectations of resolving the conflict were identified and
lowered, stressing that any resolution would require the active participation of the
community itself.
On the other hand, the researchers engaged all the likely key stakeholders who had
been brought in by parties in conflict and therefore had by implication a role in
ensuring compliance with any solution to be suggested.  Exactly what role the
Police, the Ministry of Water and Development officials and the Pangara River
Community had to play was also deliberately outlined to them by the researchers.
This was to constitute the defining aspect in eventually arriving at a solution.  It was
suggested that everyone had to get under one roof in order to thrash out modalities
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official — sometimes the same one who had come before — and have their own point
of view prioritised.  Here, fault has to be apportioned to the government officials.
Their involvement was indecisive.  They were given to aligning with whichever
faction was in their office, and when on the ground, they appeared to say what each
of the sponsoring factions wanted to hear.  This further complicated the situation.
What is clear, is that the underlying deteriorating situation was not appreciated by
the officials, who also were of a lower calibre than some of the people engaged in the
struggle.  These were lawyers, successful industrialists, factory owners, medical
doctors and others mostly from middle management and higher working back-
grounds.
Secondly, the Full-Time Residents group, who had constituted themselves into a
vigilante Action Now group, managed to attract some of the people with a natural
tendency towards neutrality.  These neutrals were held prisoner by the extremism of
the natural leaders of the activists.  Plot holders mobilised their workers and started
marching up and down the stream and enforcing the law , as they understood it.
This involved invading private property, destroying raised dam levels , and demol-
ishing illegal catchment areas constructed to facilitate the sucking pipes of diesel
or electric pumps.  The result was that the trapped water seeped through the parched
riverbed and soon dried up before reaching the plots below.  For those engaged in
fish farming lack of water spelt the immediate closing down of operations.  In the
event, neither the illegal owners nor the vigilantes benefited. 
Upon learning of this intrusion, many of the absentee landlords contacted the police,
who were thus brought into the crisis.  No arrests were made, but warnings were
issued.  However, the invaded property owners also responded in kind.  Armed with
duly registered weapons, they reconstructed their contraptions under armed guard.
The stakes were set for open warfare over water.  The water shortage problem,
which was clearly not of anyone s own making, was viewed subjectively by those
involved.  On seeing the immediate impact of a neighbour s newly installed diesel
pump or illegally expanded weir or raised dam wall, they felt these actions were
the cause of their discomfort.
Here was a classical case for intervention by those engaged in conflict management
and resolution.
Exploring the possibility of a solution
The above process had been going on for two years before the Centre for Defence
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This was to constitute the defining aspect in eventually arriving at a solution.  It was
suggested that everyone had to get under one roof in order to thrash out modalities
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After several visits to the area, including at least two week-ends designed to catch
the Absentee Landlords , and establishing physical contact as well as wide ranging
consultations with the community, there appeared a consensus that they were prepared
to sit and discuss the way forward.  During the visits, it was patiently made clear:
(1) that no solution imposed by officials could be made binding; and
(2) that no solution was possible without the participation of the enemy .
In discussions with either faction, the researchers also made it clear that they would
be conveying the substance of the talks to the other side.  This immediately intro-
duced transparency and removed rumour in the evolving process.  By so doing,
negotiations already got underway as different points of view, previously privy only
to the community, became known and were deliberately repeated by the CDS team.
Already the team was gaining confidence and asserting itself in the intimate affairs
of the Pangara River Community with their acceptance.
From the deliberations mentioned above, and certainly from the confidence that had
been generated by the involvement of the CDS team, the consensus emerged that
each faction would be amenable to a meeting of all concerned.  This meeting would
try and find a permanent solution.  Astonishingly, the Absentee Landlords and the
third neutral group were in the forefront of this initiative.  The Full-Time residents
group was ambivalent about the idea at first and had to be worked upon to see its
value.  Furthermore, business grabbed at the opportunity and donated its conference
room as a neutral venue.
An extensive advertising campaign of the impending meeting was undertaken.
Invitations in the form of CDS circulars outlining the basic agenda were dropped at
each plot entrance or left with anyone at home.  Placards were placed at the local
hotel, which was the venue for the meeting.  The author also wrote to both govern-
ment departments of the Police and the Water and Development Ministry advising
them of the intention to intervene and the suggestions that were going to be put
forward.
The Meeting: Goals and achievements
Several objectives were to be achieved by the meeting16 and this called for careful
planning and execution.  First, the way forward lay in coming up with a solution 
that would be supported and be in accordance with the Water Act.  Secondly, the
implementation of the solution had to be community based.  Participatory incentives
71
for a permanent solution.  In all the divided groups mentioned above, no one
appeared conscious of the fact that the problem lay in environmental factors and
unpredictable rainfall pattern changes.  Everyone appeared set on blaming the other
party. 
Research revealed several anomalies.  The second walking of the river by the
researchers in the company of Ministry of Water and Development officials with the
police in attendance revealed that the officials had lost the respect of the two 
factions of water abstractors they were supposed to preside over.  It was suggested to
the officials that they needed skills to deal with such types of problems in future 
and that they had to be exposed to basic conflict management training and tech-
niques.  The office agreed with this observation and left it to the CDS to arrange
relevant courses and training to which they would release officials.  After the two
factions had interacted with each other for a while they soon realised that the 
solution did not lie with the government water agents.  There was therefore an air of
disdain for each other and frustration at the failure of the government officials, who
were legally empowered to address problems around water, but had failed to live up
to expectations.15  In the case of the police, the nature of the problem was baffling.  
A group of affluent people armed with legally registered weapons, threatening to
shoot at each other for a vague cause that apparently disappeared during the short
rainy season, presented the police with a dilemma.  The best they could do was to
caution participants who had violated private property and were already taking each
other to court.  In their view, the courts would soon settle matters once and for all.
This perspective only reflected how the police are trained and which duties they
expect to deliver.  Undertaking a complex conflict resolution exercise was beyond
their terms of reference and experience.  Apart from keeping the peace, the police
did not wish to be involved, as they were clearly not equipped.  However, as far as
the researchers were concerned, the role of the police at this stage was to convince
the Pangara River Community that the initiative enjoyed the support of the law and
any options put forward would also be fully supported by the government agency.
The second highly visible survey had the double purpose of demonstrating the
team s attempts to understand the nature of the problem outside the involvement of
the community, and of making plain that any findings would be brought back to a
forum in which they as community would be fully represented. 
A local hotel had seen its patronage seriously affected as the factions in the previ-
ously close community sought to avoid coming into contact with one another.
Secondly, the establishment was now supplying water to some of the residents.
Business had become a casualty of the water crisis.  
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were to be explored.  The question of water being provided by government for the
whole community or establishing a dam through donor support was to be investi-
gated.  Thirdly, a policy evaluation mechanism — which would ensure compliance
once agreement was reached and understood by all — would be agreed to at the
meeting.  
In presenting the above suggestions, it was the view of the author that it was impor-
tant to demonstrate knowledge about and sensitivity to the crisis as well as the
predicaments of each of the key players, i.e. the three factions alluded to above, the
police and Ministry officials.
Eighty per cent of the plot holders turned up at the meeting.  A fair number of those
unable to attend had passed on their voting powers through proxy notes that were
handed to the convening authority and chair, the CDS.  As agreed, government 
officials from the departments involved attended in their unofficial capacity . 
The meeting started off with a presentation by the author, which was designed to
allay fears that the process would be one of merely finding scapegoats.  The research
findings on environmental and ecological changes that gave rise to the problem 
were therefore stressed.  Everyone was reminded that no meaningful progress would
be made if fingers were pointed at culprits before elaboration of all the factors 
influencing their predicament.  Then mention was made, without being specific, of
the impact of increased population brought about by the community s practices.  
No reference was made to the personal clashes or existing divisions tearing the
community apart, which the audience knew the presenter was aware of.  With the
police and the Ministry of Water and Development officials sitting in, it was evident
that some of the more quarrelsome characters had their natural disposition reined in,
thus allowing for an informed and constructive criticism.  In conclusion, it was
pointed out that the divisions in the community could not solve the problem, but that
the full co-operation of everyone was needed.  Mention of a possible donor funded
dam project to benefit the community and the adjacent Communal Area was made
following preliminary investigations which showed that government could support
such a venture if properly put together.
Meanwhile, one of the vociferous characters, with a sheaf of proxy votes left to her
by absent supporters, was made responsible for taking minutes.  Not only did this
make the person one of the organisers of the meeting, but a considerable number of
votes already passed under the proxy rule were also brought into play almost by
default.
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By the end of twenty minutes, some of the poor listeners were beginning to fidget —
a clear sign of loss of concentration.  The presentation was then quickly summarised
and the meeting moved into an interactive seminar mode. 
The next hour was spent allowing suggestions from the floor to come through.  Most
took the opportunity to vent long held frustrations and to score cheap points over the
other faction .  After a while it was clear that even this was not going to produce a
solution.  The initiative was once again taken up to drive the process towards
committing individuals present to reach a solution. 
The most obvious solution was the setting up of a River Board composed of all
factions .  According to the Water Act, a river board can be established to operate
under the authority of the Minister of Water and Development.  Such a board may be
constituted by any people who consider themselves stakeholders and interested in
the equitable access to and distribution of water, and development of a river system.
They are then simply required to inform the Minister of their existence.  A River
Board so established is empowered under the Act to formulate, based on majority
decisions, any development plans related to water issues.  The plans so mooted are
then incorporated into the regional and national plans if they are in line with the
general thrust of government development policy.
What the meeting agreed upon, can be summarised as follows:
l With suggestions from the floor, after prominent members of each faction
had been put forward by the researchers, the Pangara River Board was
appointed.  The last laugh was to be had by the participants who over-
whelmingly voted for the Board to be chaired by the CDS for a year.  This,
it was indicated, would continue to build confidence amongst the key
players. 
l It was decided that from that moment on all would begin to observe the
limits of their Water Rights in a process that was going to be policed by the
new Board with the help of government officials.  Water gauges were
recommended to be attached to the diesel or electric engines in order to
monitor levels of abstraction.
l It was agreed that all illegal contraptions would be removed without 
questions asked either by their owners or by the Board.
l The Board through the support of the Ministry of Water and Development
was to organise the deployment of water bowsers at strategic points along
the dividing road in cases of severe water shortages in future. 
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requirements of those states unable to muster these as a result of their
economic conditions.  This should act as an incentive inducing them to 
co-operate.
(4) That a Regional Water Authority be formed, and empowered with the
mandate to arbitrate and have the final say in disputes involving water use.
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l In order to reduce costs the Board was expected to come up with fund-
raising proposals and to administer bore-hole requests from the community
as a group.  Government would also be approached on behalf of the
community to solicit cheaper ways of sinking bore-holes or wells.
l The Board was to consider the possibility of establishing a water purifica-
tion plant on the nearby hilltop to serve the whole community.
A follow-up meeting was then scheduled to take place at the Centre for Defence
Studies, University of Zimbabwe, which members of the Pangara River Board
would attend.
This was a milestone in diffusing a potentially explosive situation and developing a
new situation which saw all hands on board pulling together.  Initially only a few
neighbours had a dispute on amounts of water drawn from the same source.  The
conflict escalated when a couple of parties became involved, and when government
agencies responsible for the administrative and legal upkeep of public behaviour
over water failed to bring about a permanent solution to the Pangara water crisis.
It is our contention that the neutrality of the research team and their contribution in
clarifying the underlying problem went a long way in enabling the Pangara River
community to overcome their water shortage predicament.
4. RECOMMENDATIONS
This paper seeks to raise awareness of the potential for conflict surrounding access to
water which is going to be in short supply by 2020 and to suggest some approaches to
the problem.  From the foregoing it is clear that some states in Southern Africa are
better prepared for the eventuality than others.  In a bid to introduce balance and
provide ameliorating anticipatory mechanisms for diffusing conflict, especially in the
unequal states, the following recommendations are put forward:
(1) That SADC should establish a Regional Water Authority with adequate
powers to co-ordinate the equitable abstraction of water by member states
from the basin — or regional Water System (see Water Act of Zimbabwe
1996:588-589).
(2) That SADC be responsible for co-ordinating national water-related develop-
ment or initiating planning at a regional level.
(3) That SADC raise funds or mobilise resources for the technical and material
Martin Revai Rupiya
requirements of those states unable to muster these as a result of their
economic conditions.  This should act as an incentive inducing them to 
co-operate.
(4) That a Regional Water Authority be formed, and empowered with the
mandate to arbitrate and have the final say in disputes involving water use.
SOURCES
ACCORD 1998. Water resources in Southern African river basins: A selection of potential
conflict issues, in Conflict Trends 1 (October 1998).
Chenje, M. & Johnson, P. (eds) 1996. Water in Southern Africa. Harare/Maseru:
IUCN/SADC/SARDC.
Guardian Mail 18 December 1998. Global warming — 1998 hottest on record, p 11.
Water Act of Zimbabwe 1996. Revised edition. Harare: Government Printer.
Zimbabwe Conference on Reconstruction and Development (ZIMCORD), Salisbury, 23-27
March 1981. Salisbury: Government Printer.
NOTES
1 The author firstly wishes to express sincere appreciation for the kind invitation, reception and
hosting of the Research Team from the Centre for Defence Studies, University of Zimbabwe, by
the Pangara River community.  This comprised Research Assistant Colonel Herbert Chingono,
BA Honours graduate, and the writer.  Secondly, the writer wishes to thank SAREC Funding on
Human Rights and Democracy for enabling the team to conduct research as well as practical
conflict management reflected in this case study on water conflict amongst the Pangara River
community.  While those involved in the Pangara River community, government officials from
the Ministry of Water and Development, and the Police will no doubt recognise themselves
from the discussion, a deliberate decision to withhold names of participants for the sole reason
of protecting their identities has been taken.  The author also wishes to acknowledge the sterling
efforts of Colonel Herbert Chingono to bring all the parties together and facilitate the smooth
conduct of the project. 
2 Executive Director of the Centre for Defence Studies at the University of Zimbabwe, and
Lecturer in War & Strategic Studies, after having served (until 1989) as Lt Col in the Zimbabwe
Defence Forces.  Nearing the completion of a PhD thesis on The Development of the Southern
Rhodesian Defence Forces from the Defence Act, 1926, until dissolution of the Federation in
December 1963 . 
3 Given the impasse currently obtaining within the Southern African Development Community s
(SADC s) Organ on Politics, Defence and Security.
7574 Southern Africa in water crisis
l In order to reduce costs the Board was expected to come up with fund-
raising proposals and to administer bore-hole requests from the community
as a group.  Government would also be approached on behalf of the
community to solicit cheaper ways of sinking bore-holes or wells.
l The Board was to consider the possibility of establishing a water purifica-
tion plant on the nearby hilltop to serve the whole community.
A follow-up meeting was then scheduled to take place at the Centre for Defence
Studies, University of Zimbabwe, which members of the Pangara River Board
would attend.
This was a milestone in diffusing a potentially explosive situation and developing a
new situation which saw all hands on board pulling together.  Initially only a few
neighbours had a dispute on amounts of water drawn from the same source.  The
conflict escalated when a couple of parties became involved, and when government
agencies responsible for the administrative and legal upkeep of public behaviour
over water failed to bring about a permanent solution to the Pangara water crisis.
It is our contention that the neutrality of the research team and their contribution in
clarifying the underlying problem went a long way in enabling the Pangara River
community to overcome their water shortage predicament.
4. RECOMMENDATIONS
This paper seeks to raise awareness of the potential for conflict surrounding access to
water which is going to be in short supply by 2020 and to suggest some approaches to
the problem.  From the foregoing it is clear that some states in Southern Africa are
better prepared for the eventuality than others.  In a bid to introduce balance and
provide ameliorating anticipatory mechanisms for diffusing conflict, especially in the
unequal states, the following recommendations are put forward:
(1) That SADC should establish a Regional Water Authority with adequate
powers to co-ordinate the equitable abstraction of water by member states
from the basin — or regional Water System (see Water Act of Zimbabwe
1996:588-589).
(2) That SADC be responsible for co-ordinating national water-related develop-
ment or initiating planning at a regional level.
(3) That SADC raise funds or mobilise resources for the technical and material
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4 Hydrologists define drought as periods of rainfall shortfall affecting the surface and sub-
surfaces supplying reservoirs, stream flows and lake levels of ground water.  Meanwhile,
economists erroneously included the meteorological, hydrological and agricultural elements as
the basis of the level of dryness and duration of the dry period.
5 Interview, Innocent Balemba Zahinda, Bradford, UK, December 1998, referring to the 1935
drought in the former Zaire.  
6 As well as later public statements by the political leadership.
7 Malawi s fishing industry employs more than half a million people.
8 Where a UN Ground Water Survey of Easter, Central and Southern Africa, completed in 1989,
is cited.
9 As pointed out in the same source, the illustrated and scientifically accurate work is meant to
serve as a tool for decision-makers in developing appropriate agendas that relate to water as a
security and conflict issue in the region.  Extensive use of its data has therefore been relied upon
in this article.  The same source also provides an average indicating that the rural community
uses 25 litres per day per individual while the urban community lap and gulp over 500 litres per
day per individual.
10 Wilson Ncube, Water: Lesotho s major export , Story 2.2, in Chenje & Johnson 1996:42.
11 The Water Factor in DRC and Lesotho , SARDC News Features, 15 October 1998 (in which
African Business was cited by P. Johnson).
12 Because of the prevailing adverse economic situation in Zimbabwe, one of the major dam and
road construction concerns has not been tendering for any work in the last 18 months and is
preparing to relocate.
13 Also known as Rodel Township. Map reference: Zimbabwe — Juliasdale, [Second Edition]
1832B3, Scale 1:50 000.  Area under discussion within enclosure: Grid Ref. from 5473 going
East to 5773 then South to 5770 and then West to 5470.  See map sections attached.
14 Water Rights issued by the Administrative Court authorise abstraction from 14 December until
1 April every year. 
15 This is a salutary lesson for those in authority who fail to carry out functions allocated to them.
16 Held at the Brondersbury Hotel on 12 April 1996, and attended by about 30 people.  (The atten-
dance list has been submitted to ACCORD.)
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